Monday, September 15, 2008
CA Widow Cannot Use Husband's Frozen Sperm
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (Sacramento) today held that a widow cannot obtain the frozen sperm of her husband, who requested that the sperm be destroyed upon his death.
Technically, the court upheld the probate court's denial of the widow's motion for preliminary distribution of the frozen sperm.
Iris and Joseph Kievernagel contracted with an IVF clinic to help Iris have a baby. Joseph did not want children, but agreed to the IVF because Iris did want them, and he was worried that Iris would divorce him if he did not agree. In completing the paperwork for the IVF clinic, Joseph signed a document entitled the "IVF Back-Up Sperm Storage and Consent Agreement." The Agreement stated that the sperm sample was Joseph's sole and separate property, and that he had two options for the disposition of the sample upon his death or incapacity: donation to his wife or disposal. The box for disposal was checked. The Agreement was filled out by Iris, and signed by Joseph.
After Joseph died in a helicopter crash, Iris was appointed Administrator of his estate. She filed a petition for preliminary distribution of the sample. The court denied the petition, citing that the Agreement indicated Joseph's intent that sample be destroyed, and noting that there was no contrary evidence of Joseph's intent.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. The court noted that "gametic material," with its potential to produce life, is a unique type of property that is not governed by the general laws relating to gifts of personal property or transfer of personal property upon death. It also held that Joseph's "right of procerative autonomy" allowed him to control the disposition of his sperm, and that since this was not a frozen embryo, Iris' right to procreative autonomy was not implicated. The court noted that if Iris could only become pregnant with Joseph's sperm, then her rights would be implicated, but that this was not the case.
The court punted on the issue of contract law. Throughout the decision, the court used contract law language, but in the end it based its decision on the intent of Joseph. The court did note a French court decision holding that contract law did not apply to gametic materials.
The court concluded that the intent of the donor controls the disposition of sperm on the donor's death. What if Joseph had a will or a trust that stated that Iris was to receive the sample upon his death? Presumably, the court would see this as evidence of changed intent. As practitioners, we must make sure that the intent of estate planning client is being carried out, and that the estate planning documents don't contradict or conflict with other documents.
You can read the full decision here.
Technically, the court upheld the probate court's denial of the widow's motion for preliminary distribution of the frozen sperm.
Iris and Joseph Kievernagel contracted with an IVF clinic to help Iris have a baby. Joseph did not want children, but agreed to the IVF because Iris did want them, and he was worried that Iris would divorce him if he did not agree. In completing the paperwork for the IVF clinic, Joseph signed a document entitled the "IVF Back-Up Sperm Storage and Consent Agreement." The Agreement stated that the sperm sample was Joseph's sole and separate property, and that he had two options for the disposition of the sample upon his death or incapacity: donation to his wife or disposal. The box for disposal was checked. The Agreement was filled out by Iris, and signed by Joseph.
After Joseph died in a helicopter crash, Iris was appointed Administrator of his estate. She filed a petition for preliminary distribution of the sample. The court denied the petition, citing that the Agreement indicated Joseph's intent that sample be destroyed, and noting that there was no contrary evidence of Joseph's intent.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. The court noted that "gametic material," with its potential to produce life, is a unique type of property that is not governed by the general laws relating to gifts of personal property or transfer of personal property upon death. It also held that Joseph's "right of procerative autonomy" allowed him to control the disposition of his sperm, and that since this was not a frozen embryo, Iris' right to procreative autonomy was not implicated. The court noted that if Iris could only become pregnant with Joseph's sperm, then her rights would be implicated, but that this was not the case.
The court punted on the issue of contract law. Throughout the decision, the court used contract law language, but in the end it based its decision on the intent of Joseph. The court did note a French court decision holding that contract law did not apply to gametic materials.
The court concluded that the intent of the donor controls the disposition of sperm on the donor's death. What if Joseph had a will or a trust that stated that Iris was to receive the sample upon his death? Presumably, the court would see this as evidence of changed intent. As practitioners, we must make sure that the intent of estate planning client is being carried out, and that the estate planning documents don't contradict or conflict with other documents.
You can read the full decision here.
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